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BACKGROUND: The lay public often conceptualise mental disorders in a different way to 
mental health professionals, and this can negatively impact on outcomes when in treatment. 
AIMS: This study explored which disorders the lay public are familiar with, which theoretical 
models they understand, which they endorse and how they compared to a sample of 
psychiatrists. 
METHODS: The Maudsley Attitude Questionnaire (MAQ), typically used to assess mental 
health professional's concepts of mental disorders, was adapted for use by a lay community 
sample (N = 160). The results were compared with a sample of psychiatrists (N = 76). 
RESULTS: The MAQ appeared to be accessible to the lay public, providing some interesting 
preliminary findings: in order, the lay sample reported having the best understanding of 
depression followed by generalised anxiety, schizophrenia and finally antisocial personality 
disorder. They best understood spiritualist, nihilist and social realist theoretical models of 
these disorders, but were most likely to endorse biological, behavioural and cognitive models. 
The lay public were significantly more likely to endorse some models for certain disorders 
suggesting a nuanced understanding of the cause and likely cure, of various disorders. 
Ratings often differed significantly from the sample of psychiatrists who were relatively 
steadfast in their endorsement of the biological model. 
CONCLUSION: The adapted MAQ appeared accessible to the lay sample. Results suggest 
that the lay public are generally aligned with evidence-driven concepts of common disorders, 
but may not always understand or agree with how mental health professionals conceptualise 
them. The possible causes of these differences, future avenues for research and the 








A significant body of research points to differences in how the lay public, and mental health 
professionals, conceptualise common mental disorders (Adrian Furnham & Chan, 2004; 
Giosan, Glovsky, & Haslam, 2001; López & Guarnaccia, 2000).  This is concerning as 
disagreements between patient and clinician about the nature of the problem and how it is 
best treated are associated with decreased engagement, lower treatment adherence, and 
ultimately poorer treatment outcomes (Fuertes et al., 2007; Horvath & Symonds, 1991). Such 
disparity was first publicly acknowledged as an issue in clinical practice in the U.K. with the 
advent of the Royal College of Psychiatry Stigma Campaign, which aimed to reduce this 
discrepancy by improving the publics “mental health literacy” (Cowan & Hart, 1998). 
Thornicroft (2000), in the National Service Framework for Mental Health, also called for 
clinicians to acknowledge and incorporate the autonomy of patients and their concepts of 
mental health into their clinical assessments and treatment plans.  However, despite both 
professional and political acknowledgement of the importance of this shift, evidence has 
continued to demonstrate a lack of shared clinical decision making between patients and 
professionals  (Dunn, 2004). An important first step in addressing this issue is investigating 
how the lay public intuitively conceptualise common disorders and how they differ with 
treating professionals. 
In an attempt to gain a better understanding of how psychiatrists conceptualise mental 
disorders, Harland et al. (Harland et al., 2009) developed the Maudsley Attitude 
Questionnaire (MAQ). The MAQ was designed to capture attitudes consistent with 
biological, cognitive, behavioural, psychodynamic, social realist, social constructionist, 
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spiritual and nihilist models in a sample of psychiatrists. Predictably, Harland found that the 
biological model was favoured overall but that there were systematic variations in the 
strengths of endorsements per disorder e.g., the biological model was the most strongly 
endorsed model for schizophrenia and least strongly endorsed for antisocial personality 
disorder and so forth. Recently, Read et al. (2017) applied the same tool to a sample of 
clinical psychologists and examined how the two professions differ. Psychiatrists and 
psychologists were found to sit on opposite ends of a biological–psychosocial continuum, 
providing concrete evidence of where the two professions often clash in conceptualising 
mental disorder.  In the current study, an adapted version of the MAQ was administered to a 
sample of the lay public in order to investigate: 1) if the  MAQ can reliably capture the lay 
publics concepts of mental disorder 2) Which disorders they consider themselves best 
informed about 3) which, if any explanatory models they endorse as a “best fit” per disorder 
and 4) where differences may rest with Harland’s original sample of psychiatrists. 
Method 
  Research tool 
The adapted Maudsley Attitude Questionnaire (MAQ) consists of two sections. The first is 
comprised of 16 items related to demographic background and the second includes 38 items 
designed to probe respondents perceived level of knowledge and the concepts they hold 
specific to common mental disorders; their aetiology, classification, research areas and 
treatment. Items probe for the endorsement of eight specific models: biological, cognitive, 
behavioural, psychodynamic, social realist, social constructionist, spiritualist and nihilist, in 
relation to four specific disorders; schizophrenia, major depressive disorder (MDD), 
generalised anxiety disorder (GAD) and antisocial personality disorder (APD) (as defined by 
DSM-IV). In order to examine what models were endorsed for each disorder, a five-point 
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Likert scale was used for responses to statements, for example ‘this disorder arises as a 
result of social circumstances or conditions’ (probing for the presence of a belief endorsing a 
social-realist model). Responses range from 1 “strongly disagree” to 5 “strongly agree”. The 
MAQ was originally designed for the use by trainee psychiatrists. To examine lay 
comprehension of psychiatric concepts as represented by the MAQ, a number of adaptations 
were made. Firstly, four items were added that asked respondents to indicate the extent of 
their knowledge related to individual disorders ‘I have a good understanding of this disorder 
[Schizophrenia, MDD, GAD, APD]”. Second, an additional comprehension scale was added 
to each of the statements in section 2, for respondents to rate how well they understood the 
statement. The addition of this scale provided some insight as to the appropriateness of this 
questionnaire for lay samples and allowed for the examination of the level of understanding 
in relation to specific models commonly used to conceptualise disorders.   
Procedure 
Ethical approval was granted by the University of Hertfordshire Life and Medical Sciences 
Ethics Committee. Participants were volunteers responding to an advertising campaign both 
on social media and around a university campus. All participants were aged over 18 years. 
Any individuals who were studying a course or working in a profession related to mental-
health were excluded. The comparison group, Harland’s sample of psychiatrists were 
sampled from the South London and the Maudsley National Health Service (NHS) 
Foundation Trust. Every junior- and senior-grade psychiatrist in training, were approached by 
post and email. Ninety trainees were approached and 76 returned completed questionnaires, 




 Mean model endorsement was calculated by the summation of the four features: aetiology, 
classification, research and treatment for each of the models per respondent. The summed 
scores provided an overall score for the model which could then be calculated for the four 
disorders (i.e. a summed score was calculated for the cognitive model when applied to the 
disorder Schizophrenia and so on). Repeated Measures Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) was 
used to explore whether lay populations apply different models to different disorders. 
Multivariate Analysis of Variance (MANOVA) was used to compare data from the current 




Characteristics of respondents.  
Respondents were 160 lay community members with a mean age of 36.5 (SD = 3.81). 
Ninety-seven females (60.6%) and 63 males (39.4%) participated.  
 
  Lay understanding of specific disorders.  
Section 2, item 13 “I have a good understanding of this disorder [Schizophrenia, MDD, 
GAD, APD]” was designed to probe perceived knowledge of specific disorders. Scores were 
aggregated across respondents, per disorder, with a score of one denoting a strong 
disagreement with the statement and a five denoting a strong agreement. Participants reported 
they best understood MDD, M = 3.61, SD = 0.82, followed by GAD M = 3.28, SD = 0.85, 
Schizophrenia, M = 3.04, SD = 0.82 and finally APD, M = 2.58, SD = 0.82. A one-way 
repeated measures ANOVA found significant differences in knowledge across disorders, F = 
(2.61, 414.81) = 55.31, p = <.001, h² = .26.  A Greenhouse-Geisser correction was applied to 
account for the violation of sphericity  (e = .87) (Field, 2005). Post-hoc comparisons using 
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the Bonferoni correction showed a significant difference (p = <.001) between perceived 
knowledge of all models other than Schizophrenia and GAD, ( p = 0.67 ). 
Lay understanding of specific models. 
Each questionnaire item was accompanied by a comprehension scale; ‘I fully understand the 
statement’. Again, respondents chose from 1, (denoting a strong disagreement) to 5, 
(denoting a strong agreement).  Comprehension scales were also summed across all 
questionnaire items providing a measure of mean item comprehension for the questionnaire 
as a whole. Mean scores indicate respondents perceived their overall level of comprehension 
to be moderate to good M = 3.72, SD = 0.69. Comprehension items were aggregated by 
model. When ordered from most to least understood, the spiritualist model was best 
understood M = 4.11, SD = 0.58, followed by the nihilist model M = 4.05, SD = 0.58, social 
realist model M = 4.02, SD = 0.61, biological model M = 3.31, SD = 2.93, psychodynamic 
model M = 3.41, SD = 0.82 and finally the behavioural model M = 3.49, SD = 0.75. A one-
way, repeated measures ANOVA revealed a significant effect of model on comprehension F ( 
5.12, 813.80 ) = 78.31, p =  <.001, h² = .26. A Greenhouse-Geisser correction was applied to 
account for the violation of sphericity  (e = .73).   
Lay model endorsement. 
In order to examine differences in model endorsement by respondents, a 2-way repeated-
measures ANOVA was conducted. A Greenhouse-Geisser corrections were applied to 
account for the violations of sphericity, (e = .80 for the main effects of model, e = .85 for the 
main effects of disorder and e = .52 for the interaction).  The main effect of the model was 
significant F (5.60, 891) = 199.43, p = <.001, as was disorder F (2.55, 404.65) = 38.97, p = 
<.001, and the interaction between model and disorder F (10.1, 1611.70) = 2.70, p = <.001. 
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Mean model endorsement per disorder for both the lay and Harland’s sample of psychiatrists 
can be found in Table 1. 
To examine the interaction effect of model and disorder, comparisons were drawn using eight 
separate one-way repeated measures ANOVAs. Post-hoc pairwise comparisons were 
conducted (see Table 2). In terms of sequencing from the most to the least endorsed model 
(irrespective of disorder), the lay sample were most likely to endorse the biological model, 
followed by behavioural, cognitive, social realist, psychodynamic and social constructionist. 
Figure 1 provides a visual illustration of the data for the lay sample with model endorsement 
arranged in descending order. In relation to endorsing a specific model for a disorder, mean 
Likert scores ranged from 3.42 (Biological model for Schizophrenia) where the level of 
model endorsement was relatively high and therefore seen as a relatively ‘good fit’, to 1.91 




Table 1.  Descriptive statistics for model endorsement per disorder for both Lay (N = 160) and Psychiatrist (N = 76) samples. 
 
 
Model                                   Schizophrenia                           Major Depression                    Generalized Anxiety                     Antisocial Personality                                                                                                 
MDD                                       GAD                                               APD 
  Lay Psychiatrist Lay Psychiatrist Lay Psychiatrist Lay Psychiatrist 
         
Biological 13.69 (2.20)* 15.77 (2.97) 12.08 (2.12)*  15.08 (3.45) 11.44 (2.04)*  13.69 (3.10) 11.98 (2.12)  11.66 (3.32) 
         
Behavioral 11.41 (1.93)*  9.37 (2.53) 11.98 (1.94)  11.50 (2.93) 12.66 (1.96)  13.01 (1.66) 12.40 (1.81)  13.17 (2.82) 
         
Cognitive  10.48 (2.33)  10.05 (2.47) 12.21 (2.51)  12.45 (2.60) 12.66 (2.40)  13.27 (2.29) 11.90 (2.21)  12.77 (2.60) 
         
Social Realist  9.89 (2.56)   10.67 (3.29) 
 
12.50 (2.57)  12.11 (2.82) 
 
12.55 (2.20)  11.42 (2.57) 
 
11.95 (2.46)*  13.10 2.57) 
 
Psychodynamic 11.80 (2.45)*  8.10 (3.33) 
 
11.66 (2.40)*  9.90 (3.91) 
 
11.79 (2.40)*  10.20 (3.65) 
 




9.59 (2.56)*  8.10 (3.16) 
 
10.23 (2.37)*  8.51 (3.24) 
 
10.55 (2.36)*  8.80 (2.99) 
 
10.71 (2.51)  9.99 (3.28) 
 
Nihilist 7.23 (1.99)*  5.94 (2.14) 7.53 (1.99)* 6.06 (2.70) 7.85 (2.12)*   6.68 (2.25) 7.96 (2.21)   7.93 (2.90) 
         
Spiritualist 6.87 (2.42)  6.00 (2.26) 7.54 (2.91)  6.79 (2.60) 7.55 (2.89)  6.64 (2.68) 7.64 (2.81)  7.37 (3.04) 
         
         
Values are given as mean (standard deviation). Possible range 4 -20. Significant group differences with Harland et al.’s (2009) sample of psychiatrists at p 


































Table 2.    




Comparison  Schizophrenia MD GAD 
Biological MD 0.55**  - - 
GAD 0.79** 0.23** - 
APD 0.59** 0.04 ns 0.19* 
     
Behavioural MD 0.55** - - 
GAD         0.60** 0.04 - 
APD         0.77** 0.22 0.19  
     
Cognitive MD         0.53** - - 
GAD         0.69** 0.13* - 
APD         0.46** 0.10        0.25** 
     
Social Realist MD          0.76** - - 
GAD          0.02  0.83** - 
APD          0.16* 0.61**        0.19** 
     
Psychodynamic MD          0.05  - - 
GAD          0.00             0.04  - 
APD          0.08             0.04          0.08  
     
Social 
Constructionist 
MD   0.19 ** - - 
GAD         0.29 **            0.10** - 
APD   0.33 **            0.15*         0.05  
     
Nihilist MD 0.11* - - 
GAD   0.22**             0.12** - 
APD          0.26**             0.15**        0.04  
     
Spiritualist MD          0.19** - - 
GAD          0.19**              0.00  - 
APD              0.22**                 0.03         0.02  
Values are given as d, p (** = p<.001, * = p<.01). Values that are both significant and 




Comparisons of lay sample with Harland’s sample of psychiatrists. 
To examine any differences in model endorsement between the lay and psychiatrist samples a 
MANOVA was performed.  Using Pillai’s trace, there was a significant effect of sample on 
model endorsement, V = .243, F (8, 227) = 9.12, p = <.001, d = .243.   However, Levene’s and 
Box’s tests indicated that assumption of equality of variance and homogeneity were not met.  
These violations were likely due to the comparatively small size of the psychiatrist sample 
(N= 76). In these circumstances analyses can proceed but with due caution (Tabachnick & 
Fidell, 2007). Univariate ANOVA’s with a Bonferroni correction were applied.  Comparisons 
were made per model and revealed significant differences in level of endorsement between 
psychiatrists and the lay sample across some, but not all models. The biological model was 
endorsed by the psychiatrists at a significantly greater level (p = <.001) than the lay sample 
for all disorders apart from APD with acceptable (d = > .04) to moderate  (d  = >.25) effect 
sizes (12). Whereas, the psychodynamic, social constructionist and nihilist models were all 
endorsed to a significantly greater level by the lay sample with all disorders apart from APD 
(p = <.00, d = >.04). Significance levels and effect sizes for the cross sample univariate 














Effect sizes (d) for differences between the lay and psychiatrist samples for the effect of model 
by disorder 







         
Biological  -2.08 ** -1.07 ** -0.88 ** 0.11  
Behavioral  0.91 ** .020  0.23  0.33  
Cognitive   0.17  0.09  0.25  0.36 * 
Social Realist   -0.26  0.14  0.47  -0.46 ** 
Psychodynamic 1.28 ** 0.56 ** 0.52 ** 0.18  
Social Construction 0.52 ** 0.61 ** 0.65 ** 0.24  
Nihilist 0.62 ** 0.63 ** .053 ** 0.01  
Spiritualist 0.37  0.27  0.33  0.09  
          
Values are given as d, p (** = <.001, * = p<.01). Vales that are both significant and have an effect size greater 
than minimum required for a meaningful effect (>.04) are given in bold. A negative effect size indicates an 





This study used the Maudsley Attitudes Questionnaire to examine differences in how the lay 
public and psychiatrists conceptualise common mental disorders.  The addition of the 
comprehension scale to the MAQ, its use with a lay sample and as a comparison tool with a 
sample of psychiatrists has provided some useful findings. Generally, the MAQ appears to be 
accessible to the lay public, warranting further research to fully test its psychometric 
properties across different groups. At a practical level the comprehension scale also provided 
some insight as to where the use of clinical language may unnecessarily impede a shared 
conceptualization between patient and professional - factors explored later in this discussion. 
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Firstly though, given the preliminary nature of this study, it is important to note 
methodological issues that give rise to future avenues of research for this tool. As noted by 
Read et al. the psychometric properties for this tool are not fully known, and construct 
validity was not tested for this adapted version – an important next step in the advancement 
of the MAQ. In this study samples were not recruited equally, the psychiatrist sample was 
small, targeted (as opposed to self-selecting in the lay sample), drawn from a single site and 
taken at an earlier date than the lay sample limiting the reliability and generalizability of the 
direct comparisons. Future studies using the MAQ as a comparison tool will benefit from 
simultaneous, identical and systematic recruitment methods. It is also important to note the 
limitations of a questionnaire in examining a multifactorial phenomena. As noted in prior 
studies (e.g. Blaxter et al. 1983), when considering concepts of illness multiple variables are 
likely to interact in ways that may be difficult to detect using a questionnaire. Future studies 
may want to consider a mixed quantitative and qualitative method to provide greater richness 
to the findings.  Nonetheless, the novel use of the MAQ for a lay sample has allowed for an 
exploration of the depth of the public’s understanding of a broad variety of models applied to 
common mental disorders. It has probed for the presence of eight separate models that had 
not previously been examined with the lay public and the direct comparison with Harland’s 
sample of psychiatrists has provided a useful initial insight as to where differences between 
professional and lay concepts of the same disorder may rest. Comparisons across other allied 
professions, particularly those found in multi-disciplinary mental-health teams, where 
collaboration is so important, is an interesting avenue for future research.   
The lay public in this sample viewed themselves as best informed about MDD then GAD and 
then Schizophrenia – those disorders that have received greatest public health investment 
(McCrone, Dhanasiri, Patel, Knapp, & Lawton-Smith, 2008) . They reported having a poor 
understanding of APD and this was reflected in the breadth of models they endorsed for the 
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disorder, appearing to show greatest variability where knowledge was perceived to be at its 
weakest.  
On the whole, the lay sample appeared somewhat aligned with the models of mental 
disorder currently endorsed by the NHS via the National Institute of Health and Care 
Excellence (NICE), favouring biological, behavioural and cognitive models. Their 
conceptualisations were obviously less defined than the comparative sample of psychiatrists 
however as in prior studies ( Furnham & Kuyken, 1991; Furnham & Anthony, 2010; Jorm et 
al., 1997; Lauber, Nordt, Falcato, & Rössler, 2001) the two samples were  found to hold some 
consistent views with regards to the aetiology and treatment  of specific disorders.  
  Lay respondents showed the greatest understanding but the least support for the less 
scientifically orientated models such as the spiritualist and nihilist models. Conversely, they 
showed the least understanding but greatest support for the more technical, evidence-based 
interventions such as the biological, behavioural, and cognitive models. The seemingly 
counter-intuitive drive to endorse the models about which the least is known warrants further 
attention.  Perhaps the participants were merely conforming to the “good participant role”  in 
endorsing models that are assumed to be aligned with the researchers views,  or their 
response could be attributed to a “complexity bias” (Klayman, 1995) a logical fallacy that 
prioritises complex solutions, even ones we cannot fully understand.  A third plausible 
explanation is that the lay sample were already invested in the more evidence driven models 
of intervention as a whole, but simply struggled to understand some of the complicated 
clinical language used in this study, and so frequently in clinical practice. An examination of 
the relationship between the complexity of language used to conceptualise mental disorders 




 Overall, both samples prioritised the biological model as reflected in the high level of 
endorsement for the statement, ‘the disorder results from brain dysfunction’ (biological 
model, concerning aetiology). The model as represented in the MAQ conceptualises mental 
disorder as organic – a neurological abnormality that should be researched and treated 
accordingly.  The predominance of a biological model has been found in some (Angermeyer, 
et al. , 2005), but not all (Link, et al 1991), prior research concerning lay populations. Its 
predominance is curious. Over the past twenty years there have been significant efforts within 
the scientific community to link our biology -specific alleles, to specific mental disorder 
without great progress (Keller, 2008). Indeed, there is increasing recognition of the 
phenotypic and genotypic variation within specific disorder (Adriaens & Block, 2016) . The 
allure of biological psychiatry, the belief that mental disorder are distinct categorical entities, 
with fixed internal properties has been greatly discussed and critiqued  (e.g. Cooper 2005) yet 
it perseveres in some mental health professions and the lay public. It’s predominance 
amongst psychiatrists is perhaps unsurprising given their primary training is biologically-
based.  In Harland’s sample of trainee psychiatrists’ their endorsement of the biological 
model appears particularly strong, a propensity that has been found to be inversely 
proportional to overall number of years in clinical practice (Ahn et al. 2006)  suggesting an 
increasing appreciation for the multifactorial nature of many mental health difficulties.   It is 
less obvious why the lay public prioritise biological concepts to understand mental health 
issues.  From an evolutionary perspective it has been argued that we are predisposed to 
categorise mental disorder, to identify poor adaptation in others and threats to the survival of 
our genes (Carruthers, 2006). Equally cognitive scientists have asserted that simple, 
essentialist categorisations like this, help us make order from disorder, expedite inferences 
and  reduce  the cognitive load in decision making and are thus intrinsically appealing to the 
layman (Barrett, 2001). At a broader sociological level, it has been argued that increased 
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access to psychiatric treatment  ( Angermeyer & Matschinger, 2001) or an over 
representation of biological research with regard to mental illness  in the U.K media 
(Lewison et al., 2011)  are key factors in the  lay public prioritising biologically based 
conceptualisations of mental disorder. As with the aetiology of mental disorder, the reasons 
for our preference for a biological model are likely multifaceted. 
At a disorder specific level some of the differences between the two samples become 
more evident.  As in prior research concerning our understanding of Schizophrenia, the 
biological model was favoured by both samples. However, the behavioural and 
psychodynamic models also featured in the lay understanding of the disorder suggesting the 
lay public also hold an individual’s social circumstance and their early development as 
factors that may predispose an individual to developing Schizophrenia. 
For GAD, the lay sample endorsed cognitive and behavioural models to a 
significantly greater level than for any other disorder suggesting they view erroneous thinking 
and unhelpful, learnt behaviour as specific features of  GAD, perhaps driven by the recent 
proliferation of cognitive-behavioural treatments for anxiety disorders (Williams & Marinez 
2008).  Whilst the psychiatrists were also likely to endorse cognitive and behavioural models, 
as with both Schizophrenia and MDD, the biological remained their favoured model, perhaps 
reflecting the primacy of pharmacotherapy in the psychiatric treatments for these conditions. 
In contrast to the psychiatrists’ prioritisation of the biological model for MDD, the lay public 
prioritised the social realist model suggesting they also hold the reality of an individual’s 
circumstance as significant in maintaining the disorder. Current epidemiological research 
appears to accommodate both models with some favouring biological factors (Sullivan, et al., 
2000) and others environmental (Peyrot et al., 2013) but with both likely lacking explanatory 
power when considered in isolation.   
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In reference to the disorder APD, the behavioural model was most endorsed by the lay 
sample followed by the biological and social realist models. That they were not endorsed to a 
significantly greater level than in regard to any other disorder suggests the lay public hold 
less defined concepts of APD. Arguably, the public’s lack of knowledge regarding APD is 
reflected in  the punitive attitudes commonly found towards anti-social behaviour, whereby 
aetiology is far less frequently held in consideration when compared to the treatment of  
mental illness  (Nee & Witt, 2018). Patterns of model endorsement from the psychiatrists 
were very similar to the lay sample, marking a clear departure from their hitherto primary 
endorsement of the biological model. This departure may reflect the historical, demarcation 
of “mad” and “bad” behaviour by health professionals, the former commonly viewed as a 
biological illness typically treated with medication in the health system, the latter a 
personality trait  typically treated punitively within the judicial system (Vossler, et al., 2017). 
Incarceration as a means of treatment has consistently failed to significantly impact on 
remission and recidivism rates (Lipsey & Cullen 2007) highlighting inadequacies in how 
professionals and the public alike currently conceptualise APD and its treatment. This finding 
highlights the need for public and professional education regarding the causes of APD and a 
re-evaluation of how it is best treated, a good starting place will be to consider the factors that 
influence how APD is currently conceptualised and why? 
Despite the identified weaknesses, it is clear that the lay public hold some clearly 
defined views on common mental disorders and that they differentiate how they are best 
understood and treated.   It is also clear that that some clinicians and service users will hold 
conflicting explanations for the same psychological phenomena.  This remains an important 
area of research as when conceptualisations are not shared between professional and service 
user, clinical outcomes are likely to be negatively affected. Given the complexity of mental 
health conditions and the many facets to our understanding of it, it is unlikely this issue will 
19 
 
be resolved in the near future. With so little certainty about the cause of mental disorder 
clinicians may benefit from considering both the accuracy and the utility of the 
conceptualisations they develop together with their clients. This MAQ provides a useful tool 
in which to further investigate these phenomena. 
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